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I argue ODNI& #39;s claim that China prefers Trump "not win reelection" tells only half the story.
Party texts show China believes Trump is accelerating US decline.
This has triggered a new phase in PRC grand strategy.
1/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/12/china-trump-accelerating-american-decline/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/1...
I argue ODNI& #39;s claim that China prefers Trump "not win reelection" tells only half the story.
Party texts show China believes Trump is accelerating US decline.
This has triggered a new phase in PRC grand strategy.
1/ https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/12/china-trump-accelerating-american-decline/">https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/1...
2. US POWER AT THE CENTER
As I argue in my forthcoming book, The Long Game, every PRC leader in the last 30 years has publicly anchored grand strategy to assessments of US power.
This is captured in euphemisms like "multipolarity" and the "international balance of forces."
As I argue in my forthcoming book, The Long Game, every PRC leader in the last 30 years has publicly anchored grand strategy to assessments of US power.
This is captured in euphemisms like "multipolarity" and the "international balance of forces."
3. STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT
When assessments of US power change, so does PRC grand strategy. This has happened twice in 30 years.
Once was after Tiananmen, which produced "hiding and biding."
The other was after the GFC, which led to "actively accomplishing something."
When assessments of US power change, so does PRC grand strategy. This has happened twice in 30 years.
Once was after Tiananmen, which produced "hiding and biding."
The other was after the GFC, which led to "actively accomplishing something."
4. TRUMP AND PRC GRAND STRATEGY
We are now living through a "third shift" in PRC strategy.
*It didn& #39;t begin with the pandemic.*
It was touched off by Brexit and Trump& #39;s election, which led Beijing to think the West was withdrawing from the order it built.
We are now living through a "third shift" in PRC strategy.
*It didn& #39;t begin with the pandemic.*
It was touched off by Brexit and Trump& #39;s election, which led Beijing to think the West was withdrawing from the order it built.
5. HELPING CHINA REJUVENATE
As Chen Jimin at China’s Central Party School observed, when it came to facilitating China’s rejuvenation, “The Trump administration and Brexit delivered star performances.”
As Chen Jimin at China’s Central Party School observed, when it came to facilitating China’s rejuvenation, “The Trump administration and Brexit delivered star performances.”
6. US DECLINE
US decline was clear in Party discourses on "multipolarity" and the "international balance of forces."
And it was clear in a new phrase debuted one week before Trump’s inauguration: "great changes unseen in a century."
The phrase is everywhere. It matters.
US decline was clear in Party discourses on "multipolarity" and the "international balance of forces."
And it was clear in a new phrase debuted one week before Trump’s inauguration: "great changes unseen in a century."
The phrase is everywhere. It matters.
7. "GREAT CHANGES UNSEEN IN A CENTURY"
The phrase is at the top of most Xi speeches and PRC White Papers.
It takes a Qing-era statement of humiliation and inverts it into a Xi-era statement of opportunity.
And it helps mark a new phase in PRC grand strategy - a global one.
The phrase is at the top of most Xi speeches and PRC White Papers.
It takes a Qing-era statement of humiliation and inverts it into a Xi-era statement of opportunity.
And it helps mark a new phase in PRC grand strategy - a global one.
7A.
As Xi put it in a 2018 CFAWC speech:
"China is in the best development period since modern times, and the world is in a state of great changes unseen in a century, and these two [trends] are simultaneously interwoven and mutually interacting.”
As Xi put it in a 2018 CFAWC speech:
"China is in the best development period since modern times, and the world is in a state of great changes unseen in a century, and these two [trends] are simultaneously interwoven and mutually interacting.”
7B.
Or as an official commentary on his 2017 national security address put it, citing Western discourses:
"Although Western regimes appear to be in power, their willingness and ability to intervene in world affairs is declining."
Or as an official commentary on his 2017 national security address put it, citing Western discourses:
"Although Western regimes appear to be in power, their willingness and ability to intervene in world affairs is declining."
7C.
Scholars were more candid.
Zhu Feng: As Western countries are consumed by populism “the East rises and the West falls.”
Yan Xuetong: “Trump has ruined the U.S.-led alliance system” and ushered in “the best period of strategic opportunity for China since the Cold War.”
Scholars were more candid.
Zhu Feng: As Western countries are consumed by populism “the East rises and the West falls.”
Yan Xuetong: “Trump has ruined the U.S.-led alliance system” and ushered in “the best period of strategic opportunity for China since the Cold War.”
7D.
Wu Xinbo: The US is “spiritually exhausted, physically weak, and could no longer carry the world.”
Jin Canrong: "World structure is changing from one superpower, many great powers, to two superpowers, many great powers.”
Hundreds of articles make these points.
Wu Xinbo: The US is “spiritually exhausted, physically weak, and could no longer carry the world.”
Jin Canrong: "World structure is changing from one superpower, many great powers, to two superpowers, many great powers.”
Hundreds of articles make these points.
8. PRC GRAND STRATEGY
It was in this context that the "global turn" in PRC grand strategy became clear.
Xi talked about "leading" global governance reform, moving to the world& #39;s "center stage," and suggested it was time to "leave behind" the era of hiding and biding.
It was in this context that the "global turn" in PRC grand strategy became clear.
Xi talked about "leading" global governance reform, moving to the world& #39;s "center stage," and suggested it was time to "leave behind" the era of hiding and biding.
9. GOING GLOBAL
This has come with efforts to build a more global PLA, to challenge the dollar with sovereign digital currency, more activism in global institutions, and a more open desire to dominate the "Fourth Industrial Revolution."
This has come with efforts to build a more global PLA, to challenge the dollar with sovereign digital currency, more activism in global institutions, and a more open desire to dominate the "Fourth Industrial Revolution."
10. RISKS OF A DECLINING US
The "great changes" concept is not only about rewards but also risks - namely the risk a declining US will lash out.
White papers associate the concept with opportunity but also with American “encirclement, constraint, confrontation, and threat.”
The "great changes" concept is not only about rewards but also risks - namely the risk a declining US will lash out.
White papers associate the concept with opportunity but also with American “encirclement, constraint, confrontation, and threat.”
11. TRUMP IN CONTEXT
This is how China sees Trump.
As an agent of US decline, he is seen as a mix of opportunities and risk.
The opportunity is long-term; the risk is short-term.
To say Beijing prefers he not win is to make an assessment about its time horizons.
This is how China sees Trump.
As an agent of US decline, he is seen as a mix of opportunities and risk.
The opportunity is long-term; the risk is short-term.
To say Beijing prefers he not win is to make an assessment about its time horizons.
12. "ELEGANT AND DECENT DECLINE"
Beijing wants the US to “realize the decline of its hegemony in an elegant and decent way,” as one Central Party School dean put it.
But it understands that won& #39;t happen regardless of 2020.
So Beijing is preparing for long-term competition.
Beijing wants the US to “realize the decline of its hegemony in an elegant and decent way,” as one Central Party School dean put it.
But it understands that won& #39;t happen regardless of 2020.
So Beijing is preparing for long-term competition.
13. THE COVID FACTOR
The response to COVID-19 has locked in China& #39;s 2017-era assessments on US decline. Now, the US can no longer “cherish fantasies about [its] capacity for self-rectification.”
This completes a strategic shift in Beijing that was already underway.
The response to COVID-19 has locked in China& #39;s 2017-era assessments on US decline. Now, the US can no longer “cherish fantasies about [its] capacity for self-rectification.”
This completes a strategic shift in Beijing that was already underway.
14. REVERSING PRC LOGIC
China’s views of Trump are complex, but its logic is a roadmap for a Trump or Biden administration.
For Beijing, if the US is less engaged abroad, more divided at home, and uninterested in pandemic management or economic competitiveness, that& #39;s great.
China’s views of Trump are complex, but its logic is a roadmap for a Trump or Biden administration.
For Beijing, if the US is less engaged abroad, more divided at home, and uninterested in pandemic management or economic competitiveness, that& #39;s great.
15. US REJUVENATION
The single most critical variable shaping China’s strategy has always been its assessment of US power.
So the most urgent imperative for the US is a policy—foreign but especially domestic—that proves to Beijing that the US is not in terminal decline.
The single most critical variable shaping China’s strategy has always been its assessment of US power.
So the most urgent imperative for the US is a policy—foreign but especially domestic—that proves to Beijing that the US is not in terminal decline.
I& #39;m grateful to @BeijingPalmer for the opportunity and for his substantive feedback, which strengthened the argument.
Thanks also to @Ali_Wyne and @ChhabraT who offered feedback and to @JulianGewirtz, who is also working in this area, for his encouragement and feedback.
Thanks also to @Ali_Wyne and @ChhabraT who offered feedback and to @JulianGewirtz, who is also working in this area, for his encouragement and feedback.
All these arguments can be found in long form in my forthcoming book, The Long Game: China& #39;s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order.
It& #39;ll be out in 2021..
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-long-game-9780197527917?cc=us&lang=en&
/End">https://global.oup.com/academic/...
It& #39;ll be out in 2021..
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-long-game-9780197527917?cc=us&lang=en&
/End">https://global.oup.com/academic/...
